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INTRODUCTION
1. Prior to the November 1996 and 1998 elections,
thousands of churches throughout the country received voter
guides from the Christian Coalition for distribution to churchgo-
ers on the Sunday prior to Election Day.' Before that Sunday
arrived, many of these churches also received either mailings or
e-mail messages from Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, urging them not to distribute the guides. To
do so, Americans United warned, would entail risking loss of
their tax-exempt status.'
2. Prior to the 1992 presidential election, a conservative
church in Vestal, New York ran an advertisement in USA Today
that highlighted Governor Bill Clinton's positions on homosexu-
ality and abortion and equated voting for Bill Clinton with sin.
1. See infra text accompanying notes 55-66.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 72-77.
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Three years later, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) revoked
the church's tax-exempt status retroactive to 1992.'
3. In the 1988 presidential campaign, Reverend Jesse Jack-
son utilized the services of numerous black churches throughout
the country to support his quest for the Democratic nomination.
The churches provided him with substantial support in terms of
a platform, facilities, and finances for his campaign activities.
Americans United for Separation of Church and State and other
groups criticized such activities as violations of the tax laws and
asked the IRS to investigate.4
4. In 1980, several organizations and individuals that sup-
ported abortion rights sued the government and the United
States Catholic Conference, seeking revocation of the Catholic
Church's tax-exempt status. Because the Church had engaged in
activity on behalf of pro-life causes and candidates, the plaintiffs
complained, the IRS should revoke the Catholic Church's tax-
exempt status.5
Christ's oft-quoted admonition to "[r]ender therefore to
Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that
are God's,"6 in addition to reminding us of our dual citizenship
in two kingdoms-one earthly and one heavenly-is a practical
instruction to citizens to pay their taxes. The Internal Revenue
Code (I.R.C.) of 1986, however, exempts certain organizations
from this duty. Most churches qualify as nonprofit charitable
organizations under § 501(c) (3) of the I.R.C. Section 501 (c) (3)
entitles them to tax-exempt status and entitles their supporters to
tax-deductible contributions. There is a price, however, for this
privilege of not "rendering to Caesar": Section 501 (c) (3) organi-
zations are prohibited from participating or intervening in polit-
ical campaigns on behalf of a candidate. To do so can jeopardize
an organization's tax-exempt status.7
The four examples mentioned above illustrate the variety of
controversies that can arise when the restriction against election-
eering is applied to churches. This Note assesses the propriety of
the § 501 (c) (3) prohibition against participation in political
campaigns by churches. To provide context for the unique
church-state issues that arise from this electioneering ban, I
3. See infra text accompanying notes 79-87.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 88-92.
5. See Abortion Rights Mobilization Inc. v. Baker (In re United States
Catholic Conference), 885 F.2d 1020, 1023 (2d Cir. 1989); see also infra text
accompanying notes 100-04.
6. Matthew 22:21 (Revised Standard Version).
7. See I.R.C. § 501 (a),(c) (3) (1994).
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briefly discuss the legal framework for the problem in Parts I and
II, including the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the
First Amendment, as well as current tax law governing religious
organizations and the particular restrictions imposed upon
them. Part III provides additional detail on the four sample, con-
troversies described in this Introduction. Next, Part IV attempts
to assess the constitutionality of the political campaigning restric-
tion in light of the pronouncements of the Supreme Court and a
lower federal court.
Regardless of whether the restriction is constitutional, it is
important to analyze why churches engage in political activism as
well as the policy implications of the § 501 (c) (3) electioneering
prohibition. Thus, Part V provides some historical perspective
on American religious political activism and explores the reasons
churches frequently engage in public debate and take part in
political campaigns. I also discuss some of the specific problems
caused by the I.R.C.'s § 501 (c) (3) provision and argue that pub-
lic policy should not absolutely forbid churches from engaging in
political campaigns.
Part VI then explores some alternatives for reform which
could alleviate the problems posed by existing law, including a
complete removal of the electioneering restrictions and several
alternative partial removals: (1) Congress could adopt standards
similar to the Federal Election Commission rules for financial
disclosure and permit church campaign activities, so long as they
do not rise to the level of "express advocacy"; (2) Congress could
permit churches to engage in electioneering so long as those
activities do not become a "substantial part" of churches' overall
activities; and (3) Congress could adopt a "five percent rule" and
allow churches to spend a certain designated percentage of their
revenues to engage in de minimis campaign activities. I con-
clude this Note by summarizing the various problems created by
the § 501 (c) (3) electioneering restriction against churches, and
then I advocate that Congress should implement any one of the
proposed alternatives listed in Part VI to partially remove the
restrictions on political campaigning.
I. RELIGION CLAUSES
The First Amendment of the Constitution begins, "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion nor
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . ".. 8 Often in tension
with each other, the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
8. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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Clause represent two very important but distinct principles in
American law. Scholars and Supreme Court Justices have inter-
preted the clauses in numerous ways throughout the nation's his-
tory. Although this array of interpretations continues to this day,
the First Amendment represents the basic principle of "separa-
tion of church and state," so coined by Thomas Jefferson in an
1802 letter written to the Danbury Baptist Association.9
A. The Establishment Clause
Vastly different theories have been articulated on the Estab-
lishment Clause's meaning, including strict separation, neutral-
ity, and accommodation. One clear purpose of the
Establishment Clause, however, was to prevent the formation of
an official national church. 10 Beyond this, the debate over sepa-
ration of church and state is generally one of degree, but at the
very least, the Establishment Clause seeks to ensure religious
freedom by prohibiting the government from promoting "any
particular religious denomination or its theological positions."'"
Though the Clause prohibits such preferential treatment of
one sect over another, scholars disagree on how much and what
kind of separation is required. One author has noted the lack of
historical evidence for the view "that the First Amendment was
intended to provide an absolute separation or independence of reli-
gion and the national state." 2 The same author also notes the
lack of evidence for the view that the Founders intended the First
Amendment to bar nondiscriminatory federal aid to religious
institutions.' 3
For the past three decades, the Supreme Court has utilized
the famous Lemon test, announced in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 4 to
determine if a law comports with the Establishment Clause. The
Lemon test demands that a law: (1) have a secular purpose; (2)
have the principal effect of neither advancing nor inhibiting reli-
gion; and (3) not foster excessive government entanglement with
9. CHARLES B. SANFORD, THE RELIGIOUS LIFE OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 32
(1984) (citing Letter from Thomas Jefferson to a Committee of the Danbury,
Conn., Baptist Assoc. (Jan. 1, 1802)).
10. See GERARD V. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA 93-
95 (1987); ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL
FACT AND CURRENT FICTION 5, 15 (1982).
11. KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 18
(1988); see also BRADLEY, supra note 10, at 55, 135; STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE
CULTURE OF DISBELIEF 115 (1993).
12. CORD, supra note 10, at 15 (emphasis in original).
13. See id.
14. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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religion.15 The Supreme Court, however, has not consistently
applied the Lemon test and some Justices have on occasion
argued for such tests as noncoercion and nonendorsement. 16
B. The Free Exercise Clause and Its Tension with the
Establishment Clause
Broadly speaking, the Free Exercise Clause protects people's
freedom to worship and practice their religious beliefs as they
choose, without government interference. Religious liberty was
among the highest values in the founding of the country.
Thomas Jefferson once called freedom of religion "the most ina-
lienable and sacred of all human rights."
17
At times, government lawmakers have granted individuals
statutory exemptions from laws so that their religious beliefs and
practices are not burdened. For example, Congress exempts
conscientious objectors from military service.'" At other times,
individuals seek judicial relief from the requirements of laws not
providing for religious-based exemptions.19  At times, the
Supreme Court has allowed such exemptions; for example, in
Wisconsin v. Yoder,2° the Supreme Court granted to Amish par-
ents, based on their religious objections, an exemption from a
compulsory school attendance law which required children to
stay in school until age sixteen.
More recently, the Court announced a less accommodating
decision in Employment Division v. Smith." The case involved indi-
viduals of the Native American Church who became ineligible
for unemployment benefits because they had smoked peyote as
part of a Native American religious ceremony. The Court held
that a generally applicable law that has the incidental effect of
burdening a religion, as long as the law was not targeted at a
religion, is constitutional and that the government need not
grant an exemption. 22
15. See id. at 612-13.
16. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (Kennedy,
J., dissenting) (noncoercion); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985)
(nonendorsement).
17. CARTER, supra note 11, at 106 (quoting Thomas Jefferson, Freedom of
Religion at the University of Virginia, in THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 958 (Saul K.
Padover ed., 1943)); see also SANFORD, supra note 9, at 23 ("Religious freedom
was for Jefferson, then, the most important of the rights of man.").
18. See GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1501 (12th ed. 1991).
19. See id. at 1556.
20. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
21. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
22. See id. at 878, 890.
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The problems created by exemptions, offered by legislative
bodies in an effort to not burden religion, reveal the tension
between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.
A government action that permits a religion to receive a particu-
lar benefit can prompt accusations that government is creating
an establishment of religion. On the other hand, not allowing a
religion to receive a benefit can prompt the opposite accusation
that the government is burdening the free exercise of religion.
One scholar has posed the question, "If a state must grant an
exemption because of the 'free exercise' command, is it thereby
granting a preference to religion in violation of the 'establish-
ment' provision?"23 Strict separationists would answer in the
affirmative, but others take the opposite view: "To offer the reli-
gions the chance to win exemptions from laws that others must
obey obviously carves out a special niche for religion, but that is
hardly objectionable: carving out a special place for religion is
the minimum it might be said that the Free Exercise Clause
does."24 Although the current tax code partially carves out such
a niche for churches, the conditions it imposes upon them,
arguably, serve simultaneously to burden religion and hinder its
free exercise.
II. CURRENr TAX LAw REGARDING RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS
A. Tax-Exempt Organizations Under I.RC. § 501(c)
To grasp the problem, it is necessary to understand the cur-
rent law governing churches and their tax-exempt status. Most
churches qualify as nonprofit organizations under § 501 (c) (3) of
the I.R.C. Since the first modern internal revenue law in 1913,
churches have been tax-exempt. 25 Section 501 (c) (3) allows cor-
porations that are organized and operated exclusively for reli-
gious, charitable, scientific, public safety, literacy, or educational
purposes to be exempt from federal taxation and for contribu-
tions to these organizations to be deductible. In addition to the
requirement of being organized exclusively for such a charitable
purpose, the I.R.C. conditions § 501(c) (3) status on three addi-
tional provisions. First, the net earnings of the organization may
not "inure [ ] to the benefit of any private shareholder or individ-
ual."26 Second, the charitable organization may not devote a sub-
23. GUNTHER, supra note 18, at 1501.
24. CARTER, supra note 11, at 133-34.
25. See Scott W. Putney, The IRC's Prohibition of Political Campaigning by
Churches and the Establishment Clause, 64 FLA. B.J. 27 (1990).
26. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994).
548 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 13
stantial part of its activities to influencing legislation.27 The third
and final condition, which is the focus of this Note, is that the
organization not "participate in, or intervene in (including the
publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign
on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public
office."28 A § 501 (c) (3) organization that violates the provision
against participation in political campaigns, in addition to risking
loss of tax-exempt status, becomes subject to taxation on the
amounts spent on political campaigns under § 527(f) of the
I.R.C.
2 9
Another type of nonprofit organization, the social welfare
organization, may organize and operate under I.R.C.
§ 501 (c) (4). Section 501 (c) (4) organizations are either organ-
ized exclusively for social welfare purposes or are local employee
associations. Such organizations must use their net earnings for
charitable, educational, or recreational purposes.3 ° While they
are exempt from federal taxation, they differ from § 501 (c) (3)
organizations in that contributions to § 501 (c) (4) organizations
are not deductible. Furthermore, a § 501 (c) (4) organization
may devote a substantial amount of its activities to influencing
legislation and may participate in political campaigns, so long as
its primary aim is to promote a social welfare purpose.31 One
organization discussed extensively in this Note which claims
§ 501 (c) (4) status is the Christian Coalition. The Christian Coa-
lition, unlike a church, may devote a substantial part of its activi-
ties to lobbying and may also intervene in a political campaign
without threatening its tax-exempt status.
For § 501(c) (3) organizations, however, the prohibition on
electioneering is absolute, and organizations which intervene in
political campaigns risk losing their tax-exempt status. Lest I
27. See id.
28. Id.
29. See I.R.C. § 527(f) (1994); see also Edward D. Coleman, Lobbying Update
and Advice for the Coming Election Year-Life Under Lobbying Regulations; Political
Rules for (c)(3)'s; (c)(3)/(c)(4) Relationships; PACs, C693 ALI-ABA 199, 215 (1991);
Putney, supra note 25, at 27.
30. See I.R.C. § 501(c) (4) (1994).
31. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(4)-1 (1991); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-
l(c)(3)(i)-(iv) (1991); Anne Berrill Carroll, Religion, Politics, and the IRS:
Defining the Limits of Tax Law Controls on Political Expression by Churches, 76 MARQ.
L. REv. 217, 233-34 (1992) (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (3)-1 (c) (3) (i)-(iv) (as
amended in 1990) and Rev. Rul. 91-95, 1981-1 C.B. 332). Although the
Treasury Regulations state that participation in political campaigns is not
included in the "promotion of social welfare," Rev. Rul. 91-95 declared that
involvement in political campaigns is not entirely prohibited for § 501(c) (4)
organizations. Id. at 234, n.104.
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overstate the magnitude of the problem, revocation of tax-
exempt status is, in practice, relatively infrequent. If the IRS
chooses to penalize an organization for electioneering, it will
probably impose intermediate sanctions on the organization in
the form of "excise taxes" for those political expenditures. 2 Nev-
ertheless, revocation is still a possibility, as evidenced by the
Church at Pierce Creek.
B. Premise for Tax Exemption
The premise for granting tax exemption to charitable orga-
nizations, including churches, is based in part on a general belief
that the activities of such organizations benefit society and
should be spared the burden of taxation. Although § 501 (c) (3)
aggregates religious organizations with a variety of other general
charitable organizations, the First Amendment assigns special
importance to religion. Because of thi s, special issues may sur-
face with regard to religious organizations that might not apply
to other types of charitable organizations.
The first premise for exempting religious organizations
from taxation is that they contribute value to the community in
nonreligious ways, thus partially relieving the government from
supporting those activities. 34 For example, churches' facilities
might be used to "promote antipoverty causes" or to "discuss
public issues."'3 5  Second, religious organizations further the
diversity and pluralism of America, offering a wider variety of
associations and viewpoints.36 Finally, in keeping with its tradi-
tion of separation of church and state, the nation has a long his-
tory, of granting tax exemptions to religious organizations:
Congress has been granting tax exemptions to religious organiza-
32. See I.R.C. § 4955. The IRS would impose on the organization a tax of
10% for the amount spent on the political activity. Further, the IRS would
impose a tax of 2.5% on any manager of the organization who spent funds
knowingly on political expenditures. If such taxes were not paid within the
taxable period, the IRS would impose an additional tax of 100% on the
organization and a 50% tax on the organization's manager if the manager did
not pay for the correction. See id; see also Memorandum from Mark Chopko,
United States Catholic Conference General Counsel, Political Activity Prohibition
(June 26, 1992), in Election-Year Actions of Tax-Exempt Organizations, 22 ORIGINS
179, 183 (1992).
33. See infra text accompanying notes 79-87.
34. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 687 (1970) (Brennan, J.,
concurring); see also Charles Capetanakis, Abortion Rights Mobilization and
Religious Tax Exemptions, 34 CATH. LAw. 169, 186 (1991).
35. See Walz, 397 U.S. at 688 (Brennan, J., concurring).
36. Id. at 689 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also Capetanakis, supra note
34, at 185.
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dons since 1798, when it passed a real estate taxation procedure,
but exempted religious organizations from the measure.3 7 This
tradition of exempting churches from taxes continues today.
C. Guidelines on Church Political Activity
Given the I.R.C.'s restriction on church participation in
political campaigns, it is useful to discuss certain campaign activi-
ties that are permitted and some that are prohibited. However,
not all activities clearly fall into one of these categories.
1. Permissible Activities
Although a church may not participate or intervene on
behalf of or in opposition to a candidate for public office, a
church may engage in numerous voter education and issue-ori-
ented activities. A minister, for example, may speak openly
about a ballot initiative or referendum from the pulpit, and a
church may conduct non-partisan voter registration drives.3"
Neither of these activities, however, involves a campaign for a
candidate seeking office. A church may also host a forum to
which all candidates for a particular office are invited, as well as
rent a mailing list or sell an ad to a candidate, so long as these
opportunities are available to other candidates as well.39 Finally,
§ 501 (c) (3) permits a church to attempt to influence legislation,
as long as those attempts are less than a "substantial part" of
church activities. The law, therefore, allows a church to take
positions on issues and engage in issue-oriented political activity.
Several religious organizations, including the National
Council of Churches and the National Conference of Catholic
Bishops, have published guidelines for their own constituencies
concerning permissible political activity. In addition to includ-
ing the above-mentioned permissible activities, the Catholic Bish-
ops' guidelines encourage churches to share church teachings
on human life, human rights, and justice, as well as to apply
Catholic values to legislative and public issues.40
37. See Walz, 397 U.S. at 677 n.5.
38. See William J. Lehrfeld, Government Relations: Federal Regulations of
Lobbying and Political Activities Under the IRC and Regulations with Focus on Proposed
Lobbying Rules, 307 PRacrSINc L. INST./ CORP. POL. AcrlvrlES 341, 351 (1990);
David Waters, Politics, Religion: Unruly Alliance?, COM. APPEAL (Memphis), Nov.
2, 1996, at Al.
39. See Lehrfeld, supra note 38, at 349; Waters, supra note 38, at Al.
40. See Julia McCord, Election Guide Suit Sparks Debate About Election
Guidelines, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Aug. 24, 1996, at 63SF.
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2. Impermissible Activities
Section 501 (c) (3) of the I.R.C. does not allow a church to
participate in or directly oppose a candidate's political campaign
for office. A church, then, is precluded from endorsing a partic-
ular candidate.4 1 Various church organizations also distribute
guidelines to instruct their member churches on what is imper-
missible, though such listings may occasionally go beyond what
the law requires. Guidelines promulgated by the National Coun-
cil of Churches instruct churches not to distribute campaign
literature on church property, support a political action commit-
tee (PAC) for a candidate, financially or otherwise support a can-
didate, or use inflammatory labels in mentioning a candidate.4 2
The United States Catholic Bishops' guidelines advise churches
not to distribute partisan literature under "church auspices,"
arrange for groups to work for a candidate, or invite only
selected candidates to a forum.4 3 When the political activity
revolves around particular candidates or even political parties, a
church is more likely to risk violating the law.
3. Gray Areas
Although the IRS has issued clarifying guidelines on permit-
ted and proscribed conduct for churches, certain political activi-
ties still render confusion as to their permissibility. Two of these
subjects are the endorsement of candidates by pastors and the
distribution of voter guides.
Although a church may not endorse a candidate, a pastor, as
an individual and private citizen, may endorse a candidate.4 4
Because the pastor typically speaks on behalf of the church, how-
ever, a public pastoral endorsement of a candidate might have
the appearance of a church endorsement. Further, allowing a
candidate to speak to a congregation suggests an implied
endorsement unless the church gives other candidates the same
opportunity.
45
A church may validly distribute a voter guide or fact sheet
about a candidate's stances or votes on various issues if the litera-
ture is educational and not partisan.46 A church may also validly
distribute a "nonpartisan" voter guide and other "unbiased voter
41. See Waters, supra note 38, at Al.
42. See McCord, supra note 40, at 63SF.
43. See id.
44. See Waters, supra note 38, at Al.
45. See id.
46. See Randy Frame, Conservative Christians in the Cross Hairs?,
CHRISTANTY TODAY, July 14, 1997, at 58; Lehrfeld, supa note 38, at 350.
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education material."47  The National Council of Churches'
guidelines, for example, permit churches to send unbiased ques-
tions to candidates and to distribute the responses to their con-
gregations. In addition, a church may distribute a candidate's
voting record if it presents a variety of issues without bias to a
candidate or party.48
The IRS, however, has been far from clear or comprehensive
in its guidance on what constitutes a permissible voter guide. In
a 1978 revenue ruling, the IRS provided several hypothetical situ-
ations in which the publication and distribution of voter guides
either satisfied or violated the § 501 (c) (3) standard. Determin-
ing whether an organization has improperly participated or
intervened in a political campaign, the IRS said, depends upon
the "facts and circumstances of each case."4 9 In one hypothetical
demonstrating impermissible voter education activity, the IRS
described an organization that had sent to candidates a question-
naire which included biased questions on certain issues. The
presence of biased questions made this a prohibited political
activity. In a second example of impermissible activity, a hypo-
thetical organization concerned only with a narrow range of
issues compiled a list of incumbent voting records for distribu-
tion. The narrow issue range made the activity partisan in nature
and therefore impermissible.5 °
However, in a 1980 revenue ruling, the IRS described an
organization that intended to publish in its monthly newsletter a
summary of incumbent voting records on issues which the organ-
ization considered important. The newsletter was also to include
the organization's positions on those issues and would reflect
whether each incumbent's voting record was consistent with the
organization's position. Otherwise nonpartisan, the newsletter
would not contain any express or implied endorsements or rejec-
tions, would not include references to challenger candidates,
and would point out the "limitations ofjudging the qualifications
of an incumbent on the basis of a few selected votes."51 Though
the publication in the 1980 fact pattern-like the hypothetical in
the 1978 revenue ruling-contained only a narrow range of
issues, the IRS ruled that printing such a newsletter did not con-
stitute impermissible political activity.52 Basing her opinion on
the 1980 ruling, one commentator noted that some activity
47. Waters, supra note 38, at Al.
48. See McCord, supra note 40, at 63SF.
49. Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-1 C.B. 154.
50. Id. at 155.
51: Rev. Rul. 80-282, 1980-2 C.B. 178-79.
52. Id. ,.
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designed to influence voters is clearly now permitted; however,
organizations have not been given any "indication of which com-
bination of the many qualifying facts is dispositive," and are left
to guess whether their particular activities are acceptable. 3
Determining whether a voter guide distributed by a charita-
ble organization is educational, nonpartisan, and unbiased is
often rather difficult in light of the flexible but imprecise "facts
and circumstances" standard. Given the absolute prohibition on
participation in political campaigns and the difficulty in deter-
mining whether voter education materials constitute impermissi-
ble political activity, the widespread distribution of Christian
Coalition voter guides in churches poses some interesting and
potentially problematic implications. The next Part discusses
some contemporary controversies which illustrate these
problems.
III. CONTEMPORARY CONTROVERSIES
Several contemporary controversies surrounding political
campaign and election activity by § 501 (c) (3) religious organiza-
tions serve to illustrate the problems posed by current law. The
prohibition on electioneering for or against political candidates
threatens churches with revocation of their tax-exempt status and
very likely contributes to a "chilling effect" on religious and polit-
ical expression. The controversies mentioned at the beginning
of this Note are now explained in more detail.54
53. Carroll, supra note 31, at 245.
54. Several other organizations have engaged in activity that would be
prohibited, or at least questionable, under § 501(c) (3). Such organizations
include the New Psalmist Baptist Church of Baltimore, where Maryland
Democratic Representative Elijah Cummings solicited campaign contributions
for the 1998 campaign; the Hsi Lai Buddhist Temple in Los Angeles, which
hosted Vice President Gore's infamous fundraiser in 1996; and the Old Time
Gospel Hour, televangelist Jerry Falwell's broadcast ministry which solicited
contributions for a political action committee to support certain congressional
candidates in the mid-1980s. See Kevin Fedarko, The Foreign Foul-Up, TIME, Oct.
28, 1996, at 42 (Hsi Lai Buddhist Temple); IRS Fines Falwell Group for Political
Acts, TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS, Apr. 19, 1993, at 415 (Old Time Gospel
Hour); Alan C. Miller & Lisa Getter, Clinton's Appearance Triggers New Church-
State Controversy, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1998, at A5 (New Psalmist Baptist Church);
Gustav Niebuhr, Court Upholds Ruling by IRS to Revoke Tax Exemption for Church,
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Apr. 1, 1999, at A8 (Hsi Lai Buddhist Temple). These
organizations and their activities are not otherwise discussed in this Note. The
controversial activities of these organizations, however, are further illustrations
of the problems of an absolute prohibition on political campaign activity.
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A. Christian Coalition Voter Guides
The Christian Coalition was first incorporated in 1989 under
the leadership of evangelist Pat Robertson and conservative
activist Ralph Reed. The articles of incorporation of the Chris-
tian Coalition describe the principal purpose of the organization:
"to encourage active citizenship among people professing the
Christian faith."5 5 Other purposes include defending religious
freedom, "teach[ing] concern for the sanctity of life, traditional
family values, ... self reliance, opposition to tyranny, and faith in
God." 6 The group initially intended to accomplish these objec-
tives through means such as education, literature, advocacy of
public policy, and citizenship mobilization. 7 In a decade, the
Christian Coalition has grown dramatically to claim organized
chapters in all fifty states5" and nearly two million members
nationwide."
The Christian Coalition is organized as a social welfare
organization under § 501 (c) (4) of the Internal Revenue Code,
though the IRS continues to review the Coalition's application
for tax-exempt status. As previously stated in Part II.A., a
§ 501(c) (4) organization is permitted to devote a substantial
amount of its activities to influencing legislation, albeit not a sub-
stantial amount to partisan political activity; is free from political
campaign disclosure requirements that apply to organizations
such as campaign committees; and is tax-exempt, though contri-
butions to § 501(c) (4) organizations are not deductible.
1. Widespread Distribution of Voter Guides
Since the Christian Coalition's emergence, one of its most
significant activities has been the publication and the distribu-
tion of its voter guides in churches on the Sunday prior to elec-
tions. The Coalition distributes these voter guides to citizens and
churches throughout the nation, though not in every congres-
sional district. In 1994, the Coalition distributed 33 million voter
guides and utilized volunteers from 60,000 churches.6" In 1996
and 1998, the organization surpassed the prior total by distribut-
55. LARRY J. SABATO & GLENN R. SIMPSON, DIRTy LITTLE SECRETS 111
(1996) (quoting CIRISTIAN COALITION, ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION (1989)).
56. Id.
57. See id.
58. See Pat Robertson, Welcome Message (last modified Apr. 8, 1998)
<http://www.cc.org/publications/ca/welcome/welcomel.html>.
59. See David Aikman, Pilgrims' Progress, POL'Y REv., July 17, 1997, at 40.
60. See id.
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ing 45 million guides. 6' One Christian Coalition leader once
referred to the voter guides as "the heartbeat of the Christian
Coalition."62 Another leader described the advantages of the
guides by noting, "The beauty of voter guides is the efficient and
effective means by which they allow us to communicate with the
electorate, educate voters, and bypass an expensive and biased
media."63
Unlike some traditional voter guides, Christian Coalition
voter guides are simpler in their format, printed on handbill fly-
ers and typically list no more than ten issues in large print inside
a simple table. Traditional voter guides typically have been more
complicated, including such items as a comprehensive voting rec-
ord for incumbents in a format not easily read or understood.64
The format utilized by the Christian Coalition greatly simplified
the issues for the average voter.
In compiling the candidates' positions, the Christian Coali-
tion sends questionnaires on various issues to candidates.
According to Ralph Reed, in an interview in May of 1995, if the
candidate responds to the survey, the Coalition will publish that
response; if the candidate fails to return the survey, Christian
Coalition staff will attempt to discern the position based on a vot-
ing record.65 Furthermore, attorneys in Washington, D.C. review
the final draft of the voter guides.66
2. Accusations of Bias
Because of the widespread distribution of the Christian Coa-
lition voter guides in churches and the limitations on church
political activity under existing law, many churches are con-
cerned that distributing the voter guides may rise to the level of
political campaign participation. As already explained, to pass
muster under the I.R.C., voter guides must be educational, non-
partisan, and unbiased.
Much controversy surrounding the Christian Coalition's
voter guides has stemmed from their alleged partisan nature.
Many groups have accused the Christian Coalition of designing
61. See Peter Callaghan, If Christian Coalition Hits Its Goals, Its Clout Would
Be Enormous, MORNING NEWS TRIB. (Tacoma, WA), Oct. 19, 1997, at B10;
Stephen Huba, Churches Offer Spiritual Guidance, Voter Guides, CIN. POSr, Oct. 31,
1998, at 6A.
62. SABATO & SIMPSON, supra note 55, at 127.
63. Id.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 131, n.23.
66. See Sue Kiesewetter, Christian Coalition Quiz Irks Hopefuls, CIN.
ENQUIRER, Oct. 13, 1997, at B1.
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its voter guides to implicitly endorse Republican candidates in
many races. Such critics have faulted the Christian Coalition's
voter guides for misrepresenting candidates' positions, targeting
only selected contests, placing different issues on the guides in
different contests to favor the Republican candidates, and coor-
dinating distribution with the Republican campaigns. One
scholar who studied the guides accused the Christian Coalition
of "systematically rigging the content of its voter guides to help
Republican candidates .. .
In 1996, the Federal Election Commission (FEC) filed a law-
suit against the Christian Coalition, alleging that its voter guides
were "'illegally' coordinated with the Republican Party."68 The
FEC believed the Christian Coalition's voter guide activity
amounted to "express advocacy" for certain candidates, and was
therefore subject to financial disclosure and certain campaign
expenditure limits. 69 The Christian Coalition responded that the
lawsuit was a "completely baseless and legally threadbare attempt
by a reckless federal agency to silence people of faith and deny
them their First Amendment rights. '7' At the time of this writ-
ing, the Christian Coalition had filed for dismissal of the case,
and the outcome had not yet been determined.7 1
3. Opposition from Americans United for Separation of
Church and State
The organization that has been the most vocal opponent of
the Christian Coalition and its voter guides is Americans United
for Separation of Church and State. Americans United was origi-
nally founded in 1947 by Protestant clergymen to oppose govern-
ment support to Catholic parochial schools. The current
emphasis of the organization, which claims about 50,000 mem-
bers, is to prevent churches from becoming too politically active
by encouraging the IRS to audit such churches. 72
67. SABATO & SIMPSON, supra note 55, at 139.
68. Julian Bond, Sample Ballots from Coalition Cause an Uproar, PHILA. TRIB.,
Jan. 3, 1997, at 5D.
69. For the federal case that articulated the "express advocacy" test, see
Federal Election Commission v. Christian Action Network, 110 F.3d 1049 (4th Cir.
1997). The federal election disclosure requirements are found in 2 U.S.C.
§ 441b(a) (1994).
70. McCord, supra note 40, at 63SF.
71. See FEC Case Groundless-Christian Coalition Files for Dismissa (Sept. 8,
1998) <http://www.cc.org/publications/fecdismiss.html>.
72. Elizabeth MacDonald & Jacob M. Schlesinger, Group Targets Politically
Active Churches for Audits, WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 1997, at A18.
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Barry Lynn, Executive Director for Americans United, has
called the Christian Coalition "nothing but a hardball Republi-
can political machine with a thin veneer of religiosity. '73 Fur-
thermore, Americans United has characterized .Christian voter
guides as "partisan political propaganda." 74 In an attempt to off-
set the impact of the Christian Coalition voter guides, in 1996
Americans United undertook an effort called "Project Fair Play"
in which it warned churches via mail and e-mail that they risked
losing their tax-exempt status if they distributed the Christian
Coalition voter guides.7 5 In 1998, Americans United repeated
the operation and sent 80,000 similar letters to churches.76
Christian Coalition Executive Director Randy Tate responded
with a letter of his own to pastors, criticizing the scare tactics of
Americans United and arguing for the legality of the guides. 77
4. Assessment
If the Christian Coalition voter guides are biased and in vio-
lation of the I.R.C., Coalition critics are technically correct in
their assertions that churches which distribute them risk losing
their tax-exempt status, though revocation of a nonprofit organi-
zation's exempt status occurs relatively infrequently. 78  Many
churches believe it is their religious, moral, and civic duty to be
aware of current political issues, and to take part in encouraging
participation in the electoral process. For this reason, revocation
of a church's tax-exempt status-on which many churches
depend for financial survival-because the church distributed
independently prepared and somewhat biased- voter guides
would seem an extremely severe, if not unconstitutional, mea-
sure. In some situations, a voter guide will clearly portray some
candidates more favorably than others because of the religious or
political positions of the church and its parishioners. In such sit-
uations, some churches certainly will be more disposed than
others to distribute the guides. Given the high value we place on
73. Thomas B. Edsall, Robertson: Christian Coalition Should Emulate
Tammany Hall, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 1997, at A2.
74. Pat Gilliland & Susan Parrott, MetroChurch's Role in Election Questioned,
DAILY OKLAHoMAN, July 4, 1997, at 1.
75. See MacDonald & Schlesinger, supra note 72, at A18.
76. See Penny Bender, Christian Coalition Sounds Off, TENNESSEAN
(Nashville), Nov. 1, 1998, at 2D.
77. See Liz Szabo, Distribute Voter Guides at Risk of IRS, Churches Told
Coalition Could Cost Churches Tax Exempt Status, Group Claims, VIRGINIAN-PILOT &
LEDGER-STAR, Oct. 29, 1998, at Al.
78. For example, from 1991 to 1992, the IRS revoked the tax exemption
of just sixty organizations; only five of these revocations resulted from political
activity. See Frame, supra note 46, at 58.
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religious and political liberties, however, a limitation on voter
guide content is quite disturbing. The voter guide controversy
shows the inherent problems of conditioning tax-exempt status
on refraining from political campaign activity. Alternative solu-
tions to this problem are proposed in Part VI.
B. Church at Pierce Creek, Vestal, New York
Another recent controversy involving political activity by a
religious organization also highlights the problem. In 1992, the
Church at Pierce Creek in Vestal, New York ran an advertisement
in USA Today and The Washington Times headlined "Christians
Beware" which implied that voting for Bill Clinton would be a
sin, given then-candidate Clinton's position on abortion, homo-
sexual rights, and condom distribution in public schools. The ad
also solicited readers for tax-deductible contributions to pay for
the ad.79 The church's pastor maintained, "We didn't violate the
laws because we feel it's our role to warn people about participa-
tion in sin."80
The IRS felt otherwise and revoked the church's tax-exempt
status in January 1995, making it retroactive to January 1992.81
The church appealed the ruling in court, and won a preliminary
round in federal district court, where the judge found support
for the church's claim that it had been treated differently from
other churches that engaged in political activity.82 However,
arguments were heard on October 29, 1998 as the church sought
to have its tax-exempt status reinstated. 3 On March 30, 1999,
the district court decided in the IRS's favor and denied the
church's selective prosecution, free exercise, and political
expression claims, finding "no other instance in which a church
so brazenly claimed responsibility for a political advertisement in
a national newspaper and solicited tax-deductible donations for
that political advertisement."8 4
Jay Sekulow, attorney for the American Center for Law and
Justice, which is representing the Church at Pierce Creek, argued
79. SeeJim Drinkard, Judge Backs IRS in Tax Fight over Church's Ads, USA
TODAY, Apr. 1 1999, at IA.
80. MacDonald & Schlesinger, supra note 72, at A18.
81. See id.
82. See Branch Ministries, Inc. v. Richardson, 970 F. Supp. 11, 15 (D.D.C.
1997); Frank J. Murray, Church Wins Round Against IRS After It Lost Tax
Exemption, WASH. TImEs, July 15, 1997, at A8.
83. See Ira Rifldn, Attorneys Argue 'Landmark' Church Political Ads Tax Case,
Relig. News Serv., Nov. 2, 1998, available in 1998 WL 7661666.
84. Branch Ministries, Inc. v. Rossotti, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4279, at *17
(D.D.C. Mar. 30, 1999); see also Drinkard, supra note 79, at IA.
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that the church did not violate the law because no financial bene-
fit accrued to any political campaign. Furthermore, Sekulow
argued that the ad "did not tell people whom to vote for, only
that voting for Clinton would be a sin."8 5 Sekulow promised to
appeal the district court's ruling.8 6 Both Sekulow and Richard
Hammar, editor of the Church Law and Tax Report, doubt the con-
stitutionality of the § 501 (c) (3) restriction on political campaign
intervention. "The Church at Pierce Creek may have crossed
over the line, but it's a highly questionable line to begin with
from a legal perspective," Hammar stated.8 7 Like the Christian
Coalition voter guide activity, the Church at Pierce Creek situa-
tion, though not completely resolved, demonstrates the
problems posed by the political campaigning restriction in light
of religious freedom.
C. Reverend Jesse Jackson's 1988 Presidential Campaign and
Black Churches
Reverend Jesse Jackson's 1988 presidential campaign for the
Democratic Party's nomination provides a third example of
church political activism that encountered § 501(c)(3) difficul-
ties. A leader in the black community and a previous presiden-'
tial candidate in 1984, Jackson relied heavily on black churches
and ministers for political and financial support in his 1988 cam-
paign, enlisting an army of over 1500 clergy. These ministers
provided Jackson with manpower and facilities for a wide variety
of campaign services, including telephone banks and publicity
events.
8 8
Jackson also relied on these ministers and churches to
organize a fundraising drive on January 31, 1988, the same Sun-
day as the National Football League's Super Bowl. Dubbed
"Super Sunday," the campaign distributed posters and flyers in
advance, requesting that church members bring campaign dona-
tions on Sunday; approximately 500 churches participated. 9
Collections were taken separately from the regular church
offerings.90
The Jackson campaign drew criticism from both Americans
United and People for the American Way, who characterized the
85. Frame, supra note 46, at 58.
86. Drinkard, supra note 79, at IA.
87. Frame, supra note 46, at 58.
88. See Michael K Frisby, Black Clergy Play Key Role in Tuesday Vote, BOSTON
GLOBE, Mar. 6, 1988, at 22.
89. See David Treadwell, '88 Church Drive Still On, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 30,
1988, at 24.
90. See id.
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practice as illegal. Jackson defended the legality of the event, so
long as the contributions came from individuals and not the
churches themselves. 9' Americans United reported the activity
to the IRS and asked for an investigation.92
Although Reverend Jackson's presidential campaign may be
the most visible example of the activism of black churches in
political campaigns, black church involvement is widespread and
frequent in state and local political contests as well.9" Given that
blacks have tended to vote overwhelmingly Democratic since the
1940s,94 this involvement usually benefits Democratic candidates.
Historically, black churches have inserted themselves into polit-
ical campaigns to a much greater extent than white churches.95
This political activity results from the church's historical central
role in the black community. "For decades, churches were the
only organizations that were tolerated for blacks."96 Having suf-
fered under slavery for decades and under segregation and
racism for several more, the church served as the one institution
where blacks could find acceptance.
According to Reverend Cameron M. Alexander, an Atlanta
minister, the black church has meant everything to blacks: "It has
been the black person's bank, the black person's chamber of
commerce, the black person's Lion's Club[;] it's the black per-
son's Sears and Roebuck; it's the black person's hospital; it's the
place where you go when your rent is behind and you are about
91. See Jackson to Pass Hat at Churches; Groups Say Political Effort May Be
Illegal, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Jan. 28, 1988, at A14.
92. See IRS Asked to Probe Church Campaign Gifts, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 13,
1988, at A8.
93. See, e.g., Michael Booth, Amazing Grace: Black Churches at Crossroads;
Political Guidance Proffered from the Pulpit, DENVER POST, Nov. 11, 1996, at Al;
Waveney Ann Moore, Candidates Reaching Out to Churches for Support, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 19, 1997, at IB; Patricia Rice, Pastors Are Urged to Keep
Gatherings Campaign-Free, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 9, 1997 at 7D; Political
Activism Runs High in Black Churches; Pastors Provide the Guiding Hand, BALT. SUN,
Jan. 12, 1992, at IA; Peter Scott, Churches in Politics at Tax Risk, ATLANTAJ. &
CONST., Apr. 2, 1992, at D8.
94. See Richard Benedetto, Tying for Black Vote, GOP Looks to Heaven, USA
TODAY, July 27, 1998, at 12A. Indeed, eighty to ninety-some percent of blacks
consider themselves Democrats. See Tina A. Brown & David Lightman, To Many
Blacks, Justice on Trial, HARTFORD COURANT, Oct. 8, 1998, at Al; Michael Griffin,
Where Have All the Florida Democrats Gone?, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 30, 1998, at
GI; Jim Wooten, Editorial, Same Standard Should Apply to Both Parties, ATLNrrAJ.
& CONST., Nov. 11, 1998 at G5.
95. See Booth, supra note 93, at Al (quoting Steve Klein, senior research
associate at the Martin Luther King Jr. Center for Nonviolent Social Change in
Atlanta).
96. Id. (again quoting Steve Klein).
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to be put out."9 7 Many black pastors view their involvement in
political campaigns as their civic duty; they are looking out for
their community's interest by helping the best candidate for
their neighborhood.9" This historic influential role of black
churches served the civil rights movement well99 and also has
served many candidates well.
Though the black churches may view their involvement in
campaigns as legitimate and crucial exercises of community
responsibility, it is difficult to argue that taking up a campaign
collection during a worship service does not violate the I.R.C.'s
current restriction on "participating" and "intervening" in polit-
ical campaigns. Thus, the extent of black church political
involvement provides yet another example of religious activity
that seems to conflict with the I.R.C.
D. Catholic Pro-Life Activity and Literature
One final controversial example of political activism by
churches concerns the ongoing activity of the Catholic Church
and its various associations in opposing abortion. Although
§ 501 (c) (3) permits the Church to engage in lobbying so long as
the lobbying does not constitute a substantial part of its activities,
the Church has been accused of participating in the political
campaigns of pro-life candidates. The controversy has existed for
several years because of the Catholic Church's deeply held moral
positions on abortion and the sanctity of human life.
For example, in 1980, Archbishop Humberto Cardinal
Medieros of Boston, in a pastoral letter, wrote that Catholics vot-
ing for pro-choice candidates would be guilty of the "deadly sin"
of abortion. 100 In another example from 1980, a Catholic news-
paper in Texas published an editorial that presented the abor-
tion positions of the presidential candidates headlined, "To the
IRS-NUTS!!!" The editorial "concluded that Ronald Reagan
alone was an acceptable candidate." '
While controversies such as these were brewing, in 1980 sev-
eral pro-choice organizations and individuals filed. a lawsuit
against the government and the Catholic Church, challenging
the Catholic Church's tax-exempt status for violating the political
activity restrictions in the I.R.C. The Catholic Church was later
97. Frisby, supra note 88, at 22.
98. See id.
99. See infra text accompanying notes 158-60.
100. Carroll, supra note 31, at 220-21.
101. Id. at 221.
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dismissed as a party to the suit. 1° 2 The plaintiffs claimed, among
other things, that the Church had "endorsed or supported pro-
life political candidates and opposed pro-choice candidates by
publishing articles in its bulletins, attacking or endorsing candi-
dates from the pulpit, distributing partisan letters to parishio-
ners, and urging its members to donate to and sign petitions of
'right to life' committees and candidates." 10 3 Because the IRS
had not enforced the prohibition on political campaigning
against the Catholic Church, the plaintiffs claimed, their own
chances for electoral success were hindered: The Catholic
Church had violated the law while maintaining its advantage of
tax-exemption, compared to the plaintiffs, who had not similarly
electioneered. The Second Circuit held that the plaintiffs lacked
standing, rejecting their "competitive advocate" theory of stand-
ing, and dismissed the complaint. 104
Despite such activity by Catholic Church organizations and
officials, the National Conference of Catholic Bishops publishes
voter guides of its own without engaging in some of the apparent
controversial practices of the Christian Coalition. The Catholic
Conference sends each candidate a questionnaire on which com-
ments are submitted; the information is printed as received,
edited only for length. Further, the Conference does not
endorse any candidate and does not print the Church's positions
in the guides. Candidate responses are printed in the organiza-
tion's newspaper.1°5
Notwithstanding the less controversial nature of the Catholic
Bishops' voter guides, much of the other activity, such as the
newsletter endorsement of Ronald Reagan, would certainly vio-
late the spirit and letter of the I.R.C. as written, even though such
activities are conducted out of sincere religious convictions on a
102. See Abortion Rights Mobilization v. Baker (In re United States
Catholic Conference), 885 F.2d 1020, 1023 (2d. Cir. 1989).
103. Id. at 1022.
104. See id, at 1030, 1031. Another interesting event, though not
involving a specific campaign, took place in 1990, when New York Archbishop
John Cardinal O'Connor issued a warning in an article in which he wrote that
Catholic politicians were risking excommunication if they supported abortion
rights. Excommunication for a Catholic would mean separation from the
Church and from the sacraments. Then-Governor Mario Cuomo responded to
O'Connor's warning, describing it as "upsetting," while Representative Charles
Rangel characterized it as "mean-spirited." See Catholic Politicians Assail
Cardinal's Abortion Threat, L.A. TiMEs, June 16, 1990, at A2; Ari L. Goldman,
O'Connor Warns Politicians Risk Excommunication Over Abortion, N.Y. TiMrEs, June
15, 1990, at Al.
105. See McCord, supra note 40, at 63SF.
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serious moral issue. To place the Church at the risk of losing its
tax-exempt status poses some serious constitutional issues.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
Before assessing the constitutionality of the restriction on
political campaigning against churches, it is beneficial first to
review the constitutionality of the broader premise of tax exemp-
tion for religious organizations. Following the discussion of tax
exemption, I examine the Supreme Court's pronouncements on
the § 501 (c) (3) restriction prohibiting substantial lobbying to gain
insight into the reasoning the Court might apply to the political
campaign restriction. After this, I assess the constitutionality of
the electioneering prohibition itself.
A. Constitutionality of Tax Exemption: The Walz Case
The Supreme Court decisively upheld the constitutionality
of tax exemptions granted to religious organizations in Walz v.
Tax Commission.1"6 In Walz, the plaintiff complained that a state
property tax exemption for religious organizations violated the
Establishment Clause by indirectly requiring him to support
churches with his tax dollars. The Court upheld the exemption
for religious organizations, calling it a neutral action that neither
advanced nor inhibited religion. Writing for the Court, Chief
Justice Burger held that the decision to grant the tax exemption
was simply a government decision to leave religion alone and to
spare it from the burden of paying taxes. 107
Although some could argue, as the plaintiff did, that tax
exemption creates an establishment of religion, the Supreme
Court disagreed, maintaining that "religious tolerance and two
centuries of uninterrupted freedom from taxation [have not]
given the remotest sign of leading to an established church or
religion ... [and have] operated affirmatively to help guarantee
the free exercise of all forms of religious belief."108 "There is no
genuine nexus between tax exemption and establishment of reli-
gion," Burger also wrote."° 9 Though the Court recognized that
either exemption or taxation would entail government involve-
ment in church affairs and that government must be wary of
excessive entanglement in either case, 11 it was quite clear in
106. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
107. See id. at 673.
108. Id. at 678.
109. Id. at 675.
110. See id. at 674.
564 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 13
Walz that tax exemption for a religious organization is neither an
advancement, sponsorship, nor establishment of religion.'
In fact, one can argue that taxation of churches violates the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment because it allows
the government to become excessively entangled with the finan-
cial affairs of churches, and thus burdens the practice of religion.
In Walz, Burger noted that all fifty states grant tax exemptions to
houses of worship and that churches have been exempt from
taxes since the country's infancy." 2 The principle of "benevo-
lent neutrality toward churches" is "deeply embedded in the
fabric of our national life.""' Indeed, Burger noted the dangers
of hostility that can accompany taxation, and that exemptions
serve to "guard against those dangers."" 4 Thus, Walz unequivo-
cally establishes the constitutionality, propriety, and desirability
of exempting religious organizations from taxation.
Another significant point about Walz is the position which
the Court took on the question of whether a tax exemption to a
religious organization constitutes a subsidy. Although the Chief
Justice acknowledged the "indirect economic benefit" that
churches receive from tax exemption,' 15 he distinguished a tax
exemption as an indirect benefit, from a grant of a money sub-
sidy in which the government would be directly financing
churches." 6 The former does not amount to government spon-
sorship of religion; it is rather the government decision to
"[abstain] from demanding that the church support the state";
the latter approach of direct subsidies, however, would entail
substantial government involvement with a church, "the kind of
involvement we seek to avoid."" 7 The Walz opinion, therefore,
demonstrates the view that tax exemptions are not subsidies."'
111. See id. at 672, 673, 675.
112. See id. at 676-77 n.4.
113. Id. at 676.
114. Id. at 673.
115. Id. at 674.
116. See id. at 675.
117. Id.
118. See Derek Davis, The Supreme Court, Public Policy, and the Advocacy
Rights of Churches, in THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN THE MAKING OF PUBLIC POLICY
101, 116 (James E. Wood, Jr. & Derek Davis eds., 1991). Though the Court in
subsequent decisions has noted the similar effect of exemptions and direct
subsidies, see, e.g., Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 544
(1983) ("A tax exemption has much the same effect as a cash grant to the
organization of the amount of tax it would have to pay on its income."), it has
continued to distinguish an exemption from a subsidy, see, e.g., Camps
Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 590 (1997)
("[The Walz] holding rested, in part, on the premise that there is a
constitutionally significant difference between subsidies and tax exemptions.");
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B. Restriction on Influencing Legislation: The "Substantial Part"
Test and the Regan Case
Although this Note focuses on § 501 (c) (3)'s prohibition on
church participation in political campaigns, the Supreme Court
has never ruled on the constitutionality of that provision. It has,
however, issued a ruling on the parallel restriction on substantial
lobbying in Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington. 19
Reviewing the Court's pronouncement in that case provides
insight into how the Court might view the electioneering
restriction.
In Regan, the IRS denied a nonprofit public interest corpo-
ration's application for tax exemption under § 501 (c) (3)
because the corporation had devoted a "substantial part" of its
activities to lobbying. The corporation then attacked the consti-
tutionality of the substantial lobbying restriction in court. The
Supreme Court upheld the restriction as constitutional. Impor-
tant to the Court's opinion was the view it took on whether
exemptions are subsidies.
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court,. declared that
"[b] oth tax-exemptions and tax.-deductibility are a form of sub-
sidy" and that exemptions have "much the same effect as a cash
grant.... In short, Congress chose not to subsidize lobbying as
extensively as it chose to subsidize other [nonprofit] activi-
ties . . "120 Further, a government "decision not to subsidize the
exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the right."12 '
Thus, in contrast to the Walz opinion, the Court in Regan
interpreted a tax exemption to be a subsidy. It viewed substantial
lobbying simply as non-subsidized activity, and upheld the restric-
tion. Had the Regan Court not viewed tax exemption as a sub-
sidy, but rather as a right instead of a privilege,' 2 2 the Court
might have struck down the substantial lobbying restriction
because of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. Under
this doctrine, "the government may not deny a benefit to a per-
son because he exercises a constitutional right."'123 However,
Regan, 461 U.S. at 544 n.5 ("In stating that exemptions and deductions, on one
hand, are like cash subsidies, on the other, we of course do not mean to assert
that they are in all respects identical.").
119. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
120. Id. at 544; see also Davis, supra note 118, at 116; Howard M.
Schoenfeld, Current Tax Issues Affecting Religious Organizations 36 CATH. LAW.
335, 340 (1996) (citing Regan, 461 U.S. at 544).
121. Regan, 461 U.S. at 549.
122. See Schoenfeld, supra note 120, at 340.
123. Regan, 461 U.S. at 545 (citing Speiser v. Randall,357 U.S. 513 (1958));
see also Georges Nahitchevansky, Free Speech and Government Funding: Does the
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because the Court in Regan viewed exemptions as subsidies, there
was no requirement that the government pay for the lobbying
activities, and the Court upheld the restriction on substantial
lobbying.
C. Assessment of Prohibiting Church Involvement in
Political Campaigns
1. Legislative History and Justifications for Restriction
Despite the fact that tax exemptions for religious organiza-
tions were originally included in the Revenue Act of 1913,124 the
specific restriction on participating in political campaigns did
not appear in the tax code until 1954. At that time, then-Senator
Lyndon B. Johnson added the provision as a floor amendment in
an effort to curb the activities of a private foundation that was
believed to have contributed indirectly to his opponent's cam-
paign in a primary election.
125
Though the apparent original purpose of the provision was
to silence a political opponent, government bodies have since
offered more official rationales. In Taxation with Representation v.
United States,126 the Fourth Circuit held that there is a legitimate
interest in preventing tax-deductible contributions from support-
ing political activity by exempt charities. 127 When Congress later
amended subsection 501 (c) in 1987 as part of the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA), it offered a rationale for the
prohibition on political campaigns that the "U.S. Treasury
should be neutral in political affairs."1 28
Thus, the restriction on church activity in political cam-
paigns prevents the purported government subsidization of
church political activity via tax exemptions and tax-deductible
contributions."2 9 Although the Supreme Court has upheld the
parallel substantial lobbying restriction in Regan, it has never
explicitly ruled on the constitutionality of the electioneering
restriction l 0
Government Have to Fund What It Doesn't Like, 56 BROOK. L. REv. 213, 223-232
(1990).
124. See Craig v. Commissioner, 11 B.T.A. 193, 199 (1928); Sand Springs
Home v. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A. 198, 215 (1927).
125. See Putney, supra note 25, at 28 n.24. (citing BRUcE HOPKINS, THE
LAW OF TAx-ExEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 281 (5th ed. 1987)).
126. 585 F.2d 1219 (4th Cir. 1978).
127. See Putney, supra note 25, at 28-29.
128. Carroll, supra note 31, at 228-29 (citing H.R. REP. No. 391(11)
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act, reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 1205).
129. See Putney, supra note 25, at 28.
130. See id.
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2. Assessing the Constitutionality of the Electioneering
Prohibition
The § 501(c) (3) restriction on political campaigns sharply
illustrates the tension between the Establishment and Free Exer-
cises Clauses. Those individuals and organizations that feel com-
pelled, as a religious matter, to electioneer claim that the
restriction is an unconstitutional violation of freedom of reli-
gion-a burden on free exercise. However, without the restric-
tion, opponents argue that the government would be lending its
hand to establishing religion by allowing and even helping to
finance church politicking for candidates.
Though the Supreme Court has never issued an opinion on
the constitutionality of the restraint on political activity, the
Tenth Circuit ruled on the collective § 501 (c) (3) provisions in
the 1972 opinion of Christian Echoes National Ministry, Inc. v.
United States.'3' In Christian Echoes, a religious organization that
was engaged in broadcasting, publishing, and conference-host-
ing, had its tax-exempt status revoked by the IRS in 1964 because
it had participated substantially in influencing legislation and
had intervened in political campaigns for certain candidates.' 32
Christian Echoes argued that the revocation of exempt status was
an infringement on its free exercise rights. Although Christian
Echoes won its case at the trial court level, the government ulti-
mately prevailed in the case. Though the opinion focused mostly
on the organization's activity to influence legislation, the Tenth
Circuit did note that Christian Echoes had intervened in political
campaigns, 3 3 and upheld the § 501 (c) (3) provisions as constitu-
tional. Free exercise "is restrained only to the extent of denying
tax exempt status" but this was justified by a "compelling Govern-
ment interest: [t]hat of guarantying that the wall separating
church and state remains high and firm."'1 34 Neither did the
§ 501 (c) (3) restrictions violate free speech rights, the court
noted. 13
5
In addition to the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Christian Echoes,
the Regan opinion-because it upheld the substantial lobbying
provision-might also seem to support the constitutionality of
the electioneering restriction, though the plaintiff in Regan was a
tax lobbying organization and not a church or religious organiza-
131. 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972).
132. See id. at 853.
133. See id. at 856.
134. Id. at 857.
135. See id.
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tion. 136 Because of religion's unique place in society and the sep-
arate treatment given to religious organizations in constitutional
law, we cannot be certain that the Court would rule similarly for
a church which wished to challenge the § 501(c) (3) election-
eering prohibition, particularly in light of Walz.
13 7
Furthermore, the true constitutionality of the measure may
hinge on whether a tax exemption is a subsidy. The Walz and
Regan opinions present two different perspectives on this issue,
the former indicating a negative answer and the latter an affirma-
tive one. If tax exemptions are subsidies as Rehnquist's Regan
opinion suggested, then the exemptions would likely violate the
second prong of the Lemon test because the principal effect of
such a subsidy is to advance religion."' Alternatively, if an
exemption is not a subsidy, one could argue that the election-
eering restriction is an unconstitutional condition. Because
political speech and religious exercise are fundamental rights
and the § 501(c) (3) prohibition conditions tax exemption on
refraining from fully exercising these rights, the provision is per-
haps unconstitutional, notwithstanding the Tenth Circuit's opin-
ion in Christian Echoes.
Illustrative of this principle is Thomas v. Review Board.13 9 In
Thomas, an employee who had voluntarily left his job because of
religious beliefs was denied unemployment benefits. The
Supreme Court held that the state may not compel an employee
to choose between the exercise of a First Amendment right and
participation in an otherwise available program. Further, the
Court held that when the state conditions receipt of important
benefits upon refraining from conduct which is mandated by
religious beliefs, a burden on religion is imposed, and the state
must prove a compelling interest to justify the restriction or must
allow an exemption.1 4 °
In addition to the issues of subsidy and the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine, the Regan opinion noted that the plaintiff
organization could still engage in substantial lobbying if it estab-
lished a separate § 501 (c) (4) affiliate organization as it had uti-
lized in the past. Though contributions to the § 501(c) (4)
affiliate would not be deductible, tax exemption would be
retained and contributions would still be deductible for the
136. See Dean M. Kelley, The Rationale for the Involvement of Religion in the
Body Politic, in THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN THE MAKING OF PUBLIC POLICY 159,
supra note 118, at 183.
137. See id.
138. See Davis, supra note 118, at 117.
139. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
140. Id. at 717-18.
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§ 501(c) (3) organization."' The concurring opinion written by
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, indi-
cated that these justices would have dissented on grounds of free
speech if not for the § 501 (c) (4) option.1 42 Although none of
these justices remain on the Court today, the concurring opinion
may be evidence that an absolute prohibition on political cam-
paign participation by nonprofit organizations is not completely
warranted as a constitutional matter.
Although these above-mentioned factors would weigh
against the constitutionality of the electioneering restriction, few
discussions of potential burdens on religion would be complete
without applying Employment Division v. Smith,143 one of the
Supreme Court's more significant pronouncements on free exer-
cise law. The Court in Smith held that a generally applicable law
that has the incidental effect of burdening a religion, so long as
the law was not targeting a religion, is constitutional and the gov-
ernment need not show a compelling interest.1 44  Further,
though the government may grant an exemption, it is not
required to do so.14
Applying the Smith case to the § 501 (c) (3) prohibition on
electioneering might indicate that the restraint is valid as a gen-
erally applicable law not aimed at any one particular religion or
even religion in general. Section 501 (c) (3) applies to many
types of nonprofit organizations and not merely religious organi-
zations or churches. An exemption against the electioneering
restriction, based on free exercise, therefore, would not likely be
mandated. However, exempting churches from the provision
could still be permissible under a Smith analysis.
Thus, several constitutional arguments can be made against
the prohibition on participation in political campaigns, though
the Smith and the Christian Echoes holdings argue in favor of its
legality. In light of Smith, "one simply cannot say with any cer-
tainty whether the Supreme Court might use the Free Exercise
Clause to invalidate the limitations on political activity set forth
141. See Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983).
142. See id. at 553 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Although Justice
Blackmun's concurrence blesses a § 501 (c) (3) organization which creates a
separate § 501 (c) (4) organization to engage in substantial lobbying, we cannot be
certain that the same blessing would apply if a § 501 (c) (4) organization was
established to engage in political campaign activity. See Chopko, supra note 32, at
184. Nevertheless, the opinion does not explicitly prohibit such a § 501(c) (4)
organization.
143. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
144. See id. at 878, 884-85.
145. See id. at 890.
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in section 501(c) (3)."146 Although the political campaign provi-
sion is not necessarily unconstitutional, neither is it clearly
constitutional.
V. CHURCHES AND POLITICAL ACTMSM: HISTORY
AND RATIONALE
Even if the § 501 (c) (3) provision is legitimate as a constitu-
tional matter-an uncertain proposition itself-the wisdom of a
policy that restricts church political activity is a separate matter.
In other words, simply because a legislative provision may be con-
stitutional does not mean the provision is wise policy. In addi-
tion to the constitutional-versus-legislative policy distinction, it is
important to separate the church policy question of whether
churches should engage in political campaigns from the govern-
ment policy question of whether churches should be absolutely
barred-as a condition of tax-exempt status-from doing so.
Noted scholar, former Protestant minister, and now Catholic
priest Richard John Neuhaus has criticized excessive politicking in
the church, noting that religion often does not provide clear
answers to political questions and that politicizing certain issues
can dilute the impact of the gospel message:
It's bad for religion because it dilutes the credibility of the
religious force. If you say, "Thus says the Lord" in respect
to everything, including those things on which the Lord
has not expressed [H]is will, you throw into doubt the
words you have to speak when you are authorized to say,
"Thus says the Lord."
14 7
Neuhaus is no doubt correct that a church's message can be
diluted if packaged too tightly with one political viewpoint; one
can imagine many scenarios in which it might be unwise for a
church to engage in a political campaign. Indeed the teachings
of some churches prohibit political involvement. Nevertheless,
this does not justify an absolute prohibition on church participa-
tion in campaigns-extending so far as to forbid the distribution
of a voter guide that may reflect a degree of bias. This Part of the
Note will briefly discuss some historical examples of church par-
ticipation in political issues and campaigns. It will then explore
why churches become involved in the political process and some
particular policy problems presented by the current restrictions
of the I.R.C.
146. Davis, supra note 118, at 113.
147. DanielJ. Lehmann, Editorial, Politics and Religion: Line Dividing Them
Has Gotten Blurred in This Year's Campaign, CHI. SuN-TIMES, Sep. 25, 1988, at 45.
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A. Historical Role of Churches in the Political Process
Contrary to the beliefs and desires of some, the Establish-
ment Clause does not prohibit churches from participating in
public debate. Churches very often articulate strong viewpoints
in the public arena and have the right to do so. 4 ' Churches, in
fact, have played an active role in the political process through-
out the country's history.
For example, churches vigorously participated in the debate
over slavery, an issue that dominated political discussion in the
mid-1800s. Abolitionist churches in the North decried the evils
of the institution, while pro-slavery churches in the South
defended the practice. 149 Churches were "among the first groups
in the country to oppose [slavery], and the most fervent and per-
sistent."15 They provided both the "moral determination" and
the members for organizations such as the American Anti-Slavery
Society; these churches initiated "petitions and pleas" against
slavery and ultimately advocated civil war.' Given that the
Republican Party was founded in the 1850s to oppose slavery and
its expansion, 5 2 many religious leaders and organizations with
abolitionist positions took part in partisan politics and assisted
specific candidates,' 5 3 a practice that the current I.R.C. forbids.
The temperance movement provides an historical example
of intense church political involvement in the late 1800s and
early 1900s. Churches led the effort to outlaw the manufacture
and sale of alcohol by establishing the Anti-Saloon League, which
ultimately led to the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment.
154
The fact that the Twenty-First Amendment later repealed the
Eighteenth is not at issue here; the important item of note is that
religious people and religious organizations were chiefly respon-
sible for passing a law addressing a highly important political
issue at the time. The constitution of the Ohio Anti-Saloon
148. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 670 (1970).
149. See Kelley, supra note 136, at 162.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 162-63.
152. See THOMAS A. BAILEY & DAVID M. KENNEDY, THE AMEICAN PAGEANT
388 (8th ed. 1987).
153. See Michael E. Smith, Religious Activism: The Historical Record, 27 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 1087, 1092 (1986) (citations omitted) ("As a result of their
commitments to particular causes, such as prohibition or abolition, and also
because of broader allegiances, religious groups and their leaders at times have
involved themselves in partisan elections. Major occasions for religious
partisanship have included the presidential candidacies of Thomas Jefferson,
Andrew Jackson, Grover Cleveland, William Jennings Bryan, Alfred E. Smith,
and John F. Kennedy.").
154. See Kelley, supra note 136, at 161-62.
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League, for example, declared that it would "combine and con-
centrate the various churches, temperance organizations and
individuals" to oppose saloons. 155 Though the Ohio organiza-
tion did not seek affiliation with a particular political party, it
sought to "secure the support of the individual members and
officers of all the political organizations of the state."1 5 ' Like
abolitionists, the prohibition forces utilized the assistance of
churches and rallied around candidates who supported their
agenda, something seemingly "prohibited" under § 501 (c) (3) of
today's I.R.C.
In addition to abolition and prohibition, churches were
active participants in several other issues in the first 150 years of
the nation. One interesting nineteenth-century political struggle
in which churches were involved was the drive to ban the histori-
cal gentlemen's practice of dueling to settle arguments. Shortly
after the famous duel in 1804 in which Aaron Burr shot Alexan-
der Hamilton, preachers began delivering sermons against the
practice of dueling. After much pressure from churches acting
corporately, many states finally drafted legislation to criminalize
the practice, and by the mid-1800s, dueling had disappeared
throughout the country. One famous preacher at the time,
Lyman Beecher, called on his followers to refrain from support-
ing candidates for political office who dueled.157
The civil rights movement provides probably the most prom-
inent twentieth-century example of church involvement in polit-
ical affairs. It is well-known that black churches in the South
provided the infrastructure for the civil rights struggle in the
1950s and 1960s. Hubert Humphrey once remarked that the
landmark Civil Rights Act of 1964 would never have passed with-
out the support of churches and synagogues. 158 Black clergy-
men, including Martin Luther King, Jr., led the movement;
churches financially supported the NAACP; and the movement
used blatantly religious arguments in advocating civil rights. 159
The purpose of Martin Luther King Jr.'s "Letter from Birming-
ham Jail" was to enlist white churches in supporting the civil
rights movement. 160
155. Howard H. Russell, The Anti-Saloon Conflict (visited Nov. 23, 1998)
<http://www.history.ohio-state.edu/projects/prohibition/Russell-on-asl.htm>.
156. Id.
157. See Kelley, supra note 136, at 163-64.
158. See id. at 161.
159. See Michael J. Sandel, The Constitution of the Procedural Republic: Liberal
Rights and Civic Virtues, 66 FoRDHAm L. REv. 1, 12 (1997).
160. See Douglas Laycock, Freedom of Speech That is Both Religious and
Political, 29 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 793, 802 (1996).
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The point in mentioning these examples of abolition, prohi-
bition, anti-dueling, and civil rights is not to create a comprehen-
sive historical list of church political activism. Such a task is
beyond the scope of this writing. Rather, these examples docu-
ment the central role played by religious organizations in the for-
mation of public policy. Political activism by churches for both
issues and candidates is not a new phenomenon that first
emerged in the last two decades. 61 On the contrary, church
political activism has been part of the American political land-
scape since its inception and merely continues to be so today. As
Mike Hammar, editor of the Church Law and Tax Report states,
"The practice of churches and clergy engaging in political rheto-
ric and activity is something that predates the Constitution."
16 2
B. Justification for Church Political Activism
While not all churches advocate participation in politics, it is
certainly not an infrequent occurrence. The reasons that
churches engage in politicking are many. One key justification
for church involvement is the responsibility they feel to influence
politics with their values. David Beckmann, a pastor who heads
the Christian organization Bread for the World, which engages
in lobbying efforts to combat world hunger, has said, "the Chris-
tian faith and moral teaching have implications for politics.
Churches should be active in bringing those values to bear in
political life."' 6 ' Indeed, some proponents of various religious
traditions, Judaism and Christianity in particular, hold that mem-
bers incur an obligation to become active in the political
arena.164
As part of their mission, churches have an interest in seeing
that justice is carried out in society."' The result of pursuing
justice as a "religious obligation" is that a collective body of
believers will speak out on contemporary political issues to influ-
ence the political system with the values of the religion. 'Justice
is not something that can be attained solely by individuals in
their relationships with other individuals, but is a systemic attri-
161. See Smith, supra note 153, at 1093-94 (citations omitted) ("[E]ven in
the heyday of evangelical privatism, Southern Baptists, Methodists, and
Presbyterians were propelled into the political arena by their commitment to
personal reform through law, and in particular to Prohibition. They also
actively promoted the election of upright Christian candidates for public
office.").
162. Frame, supra note 46, at 61.
163. McCord, supra note 40, at 63SF.
164. See Kelley, supra note 136, at 168.
165. See id. at 175.
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bute of social structures that must be attained by affecting those
structures."' 66
According to Roswell P. Barnes in Under Orders: The Churches
and Public Affairs, the Christian church "must be involved in pub-
lic affairs because it must stand for God's work in the world
through Christ. . . . The church has no choice but to be con-
cerned with men's personal relations with one another .... The
church is also concerned with what the structures and processes
of society do to people ... ."1 In other words, it has the
"responsibility to guide its members in distinguishing right from
wrong, whether practical in, or out of government."168 Hence,
churches have a responsibility to be actively involved in the soci-
ety to which they proclaim their message. Participation in the
political arena is thus part of their religious mandate to be "salt"
and "light."'69
Another justification for church involvement in politics,
though related to the obligation of churches to influence society,
is to function as an intermediate institution that mediates
between the government and citizens-to provide an "independ-
ent moral voice," in essence a check against government
power.170 Such a function for churches in society serves to pre-
serve freedom by limiting the authority the state may have over
the individual. 171 In this respect, then, churches serve as "auton-
omous communities of resistance and as independent sources of
meaning."1 72 By intervening in the political arena, the church
becomes an important political actor that can serve as a uniquely
qualified moral critic to the policies of government.
While some might question the propriety of a church's par-
ticipation in politicking as a violation of the Establishment
Clause, the Supreme Court validated a church's right to have a
voice in society in the Walz case. ChiefJustice Burger wrote that
churches and their adherents "frequently take strong positions
on public issues including . . . vigorous advocacy of legal and
constitutional provisions.... Churches as much as secular bodies
166. Id. at 171.
167. RoswELL P. BARNES, UNDER ORDERS: THE CHURCHES AND PUBLIC
AFFnRS 25 (1961); see also Kelley, supra note 136, at 173.
168. Tony Maggio, Editorial, Churches Help Distinguish Right, Wrong, DAILY
OKLAHomAN, July 26, 1997, at 6.
169. Matthew 5:13-16. Christ's explanation to His followers that they are
the "salt of the earth" and the "light of the world" captures His directive to
make a difference for His sake in a world of evil and darkness.
170. CARTER, supra note 11, at 36-37.
171. See id. at 38.
172. Id. at 40.
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and private citizens have that right."173 Indeed, in Harris v.
McRae,174 the plaintiffs argued that a law which included restric-
tions on abortion was unconstitutional because its passage had
been influenced by religious organizations. The Supreme Court
resoundingly rejected this argument, writing that a law is not
unconstitutional solely because it coincides with the religious
beliefs of a church. 75
Along similar lines, in 1941 the Third Circuit considered
whether it could deny a tax deduction for a bequest made to a
religious organization because the organization had tried to
influence legislation, an activity that the tax commissioner con-
sidered non-charitable. The Court responded in the negative,
and wrote that it was "perfectly natural" for the religious not only
to attempt to influence others, but to seek to "secure the sanc-
tions of organized society for or against outward practices
thought to be essential ....
In his book Religious Convictions and Political Choice, Kent
Greenawalt maintains that political activity by religious groups is
constitutionally protected and should be considered "a healthy
part of a liberal democracy. "177 Conceding that such activity "is
sometimes divisive" he maintains that "churches and related
organizations represent both particular interests that warrant
advocacy and deep strains of conscience.1 78
Thus, American history and the Supreme Court have vali-
dated the right of a church and religious individuals to partici-
pate in the political debate. Furthermore, the Court has
never held as a matter of law that it is improper, or a viola-
tion of the separation of church and state for religious
leaders (or followers) to preach, teach, persuade, organize,
agitate, or mobilize citizen support for (or against) public
policies, or even for (or against) candidates for public
offices. 179
C. Problems with the § 501(c)(3) Restriction
Stephen Carter has likened the supposed "tradeoff' between
tax-exemption and restrictions on political activity to a "Faustian
173. Wal, 397 U.S. at 670; see also Kelley, supra note 136, at 178.
174. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
175. See id. at 319.
176. Kelley, supra note 136, at 181 (citing Girard Trust Co. v. Commissioner,
122 F.2d 108, 110-11 (1941)).
177. GREENAWALT, supra note 11, at 251.
178. Id.
179. Kelley, supra note 136, at 180.
576 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 13
bargain." '  In describing such a bargain as "Faustian," he
implies that the churches have sold out to the government and
believes that they have now become "addicted to government
aid." 81 He partially blames the churches for letting government
become too involved in their affairs in their eagerness to gain
exempt status. Such a bargain opens them up to regulation by
the state.'8 2 Whether his metaphor of a bargain accurately
describes the situation, it certainly illustrates the dilemma
churches face regarding their ability to participate actively in the
political process.
1. First Problem: Separating Deeply Held Religious Beliefs
from Political Viewpoints
It is often difficult to separate people's religious views from
their positions on political issues. Indeed, if such a separation
were required in the public debate, it would tend to penalize the
most devout of believers, because one's religious convictions and
teachings are obviously vital and provide purposeful meaning to
their lives. Devout individuals are likely to have stronger views on
those issues which are simultaneously political and religious.
"For the religiously devout citizen, faith may be so intertwined
with personality that it is impossible to tell when one is acting, or
not acting from religious motive ... ."183
Although some may argue that citizens should exclude
purely religious arguments and present arguments in only secu-
lar terms,184 other scholars have disagreed. 18  Michael J. Perry,
in discussing the role of religion in public debate, notes the
importance of religiously based arguments, advocating that "we
should welcome the presentation of religiously based moral argu-
ments in all areas of our public culture, including public debate
specifically about contested political choices."' 8 6
Given the right of religious believers to publicly present reli-
gious arguments, the contributions that religious viewpoints can
make to political culture, and the centrality of religious beliefs to
personality, it is unfair and often impossible to separate one's
religious perspective from one's political viewpoint. Indeed,
many current political issues are determined or influenced by
180. CARTER, supra note 11, at 147-52.
181. Id. at 152.
182. See id. at 147, 152.
183. Id. at 111.
184. See generally, e.g., JOHN RAwLS, POLmicAL LIBERALISM (1993).
185. See generally, e.g., Laycock, supra note 160; Michael J. Perry, Religious
Arguments in Public Political Debate, 29 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1421 (1996).
186. Perry, supra note 185, at 1421.
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religious doctrine or convictions. 18 7 The Catholic Church's view
of abortion as objectively gravely immoral is a notable example.
Other examples include the positions of various churches on
homosexuality, racism, military action, and public assistance.
Individuals and churches who are unable to separate or who
choose not to separate their religious convictions from their vot-
ing decisions will vote, or will encourage their congregations to
vote, according to their religious doctrines. Obviously, if a polit-
ical issue also concerns a moral or religious teaching of a church,
these individuals will tend to vote for candidates who maintain
positions that most closely coincide with their religious doctrines.
Thus, "[i] t is both impossible and undesirable to completely sep-
arate religion and politics in discussing issues and national and
world events."' 8
Key issues often rise to the forefront of societal debate to
define an election contest. Abolition in the early and middle
1800s, prohibition in the early 1900s, civil rights in the middle
and late 1900s, and abortion in the late 1900s can all claim this
status. All of these issues were religious concerns, featured
intense involvement by religious organizations, and became
defining campaign issues; this activism by religious organizations
influenced the electorate and helped to shape public policy.
Such religious concerns frequently play central roles in political
campaigns and become litmus-tests for individual voters and
organizations in the voting decision.
2. Second Problem: Distinguishing Between Issue Advocacy
and Candidate Advocacy
Under existing law a charitable organization may devote
some of its activities to influencing legislation, so long as it is less
than a "substantial part."'1 89 A charitable organization, then, is
permitted to articulate opinions on public issues and attempt to
influence public opinion."O It may advocate specific issues and
distribute materials as part of its normal activities. This includes
tracking voting records on substantive issues, though organiza-
tions cannot expand the distribution of materials at election time
beyond their usual audiences.19 1
187. Some religions might maintain that some issues are not really
political issues at all, but absolute moral issues. See, e.g., Capetanakis, supra note
34. For purposes of this Note, this distinction will not be made.
188. Putney, supra note 25, at 30.
189. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(3)(i)
(1991).
190. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (3)-1(d) (2) (1994).
191. See Lehrfeld, supra note 38, at 353.
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Although issue advocacy is permitted, candidate advocacy is
not. Participating or intervening in an election on behalf of or
in opposition to a candidate is prohibited under § 501 (c) (3).
Such a restriction includes financial support as well as "in-kind"
contributions of services, publicity, advertising, and use of facili-
ties. This restriction encompasses the explicit and implicit
endorsement of candidates and extends to the publication or dis-
tribution of literature for or against a candidate, including parti-
san voter guides. 192
If a church publishes a statement that says, "Vote for candi-
date X," it clearly violates current law. However, determining
whether a church has implicitly endorsed a candidate is more
difficult. For example, if a church allows a candidate friendly to
its views to speak in a Sunday morning service about her posi-
tions on the campaign issues, has it endorsed the candidate?
Under IRS rules, such a practice would seem to be permissible if
other candidates are offered the same opportunity.198 Has the
church made an implicit endorsement if it allows a candidate to
deliver the Sunday morning sermon without mentioning the
campaign? In practical effect, quite possibly, though it appears
no technical violation of the law occurs. More than likely the
case would be determined by applying the IRS's "fact and cir-
cumstances" standard.1 94
The same problems exist with voter guides. As discussed in
Part II, a church can distribute voter guides so long as they are
educational, unbiased, nonpartisan, and present a variety of
issues. As noted, a church can speak out on political issues. A
voter guide can attempt to educate by presenting candidates'
positions on a variety of issues, including those of special concern
to a church. Yet the voter guide might make one candidate look
more favorable to a church based on her positions. The voter
guide might look like an implied endorsement to some individu-
als, but could be considered unbiased and nonpartisan by others;
the situation could legitimately be argued either way. Again, one
might need to resort to the "facts and circumstances" standard.
Thus, the line between advocating issues and candidates is a
rather murky one. Consider three situations in which a minister
engages in the following actions: (1) encourages his church to
oppose abortion and to vote in the upcoming election; (2)
encourages his church to vote for pro-life candidates; (3) encour-
192. See id. at 344-45, 349-50.
193. See id. at 351.
194. See Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-1 C.B. 154; supra text accompanying note
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ages his church to vote for candidate X, who opposes abortion.
The effect in the three situations is substantially the same,
although the law treats them differently. Under existing law, sce-
nario one is clearly legal and scenario three is clearly illegal. Sce-
nario two is a gray area, though it is perhaps legal because no
specific candidate is involved. The three hypotheticals illustrate
that "the distinction between discussion of issues and candidates
and advocacy of election or defeat of candidates may often dis-
solve in practical application." 95 The reason for this is because
"[d]iscussion of issues and events inevitably involves political
candidates."196
D. Assessing the § 501(c)(3) Restriction as a Policy
To summarize the foregoing discussion, a church's religious
doctrine will tend to shape its stance on political issues, which in
turn will influence its opinion on candidates in an election. An
election may feature a clear choice, in which one candidate is
viewed as taking the "right" stands on the issues, and another
candidate is viewed as taking the "wrong" stands. Naturally, a
church will be inclined toward the former candidate. The cur-
rent polarization over the abortion issue is a prime example of
this concept.
It is therefore not surprising that a church might be
inclined, in a sincere attempt to carry out its view of scripture, to
assist the campaign of one candidate and oppose the efforts of
another candidate. However, current tax rules would restrict the
church from doing this and might pose a threat to its exempt
status. Should a religious organization be threatened with losing
tax-exempt status because it expresses a preference for a candi-
date with whom it agrees on a significant moral issue such as
racism or abortion, or if it expresses an opinion against the
opposing candidate? Should a church be threatened with loss of
its tax-exempt status if it distributes voter education literature
that shows some candidates' positions as being more consistent
with the church's religious teachings?
Loss of tax exemption is an unduly severe measure for
churches that engage in minimal campaign activities, particularly
if those activities are based on sincere moral or religious convic-
tions. The controversies cited in Part III-church distribution of
Christian Coalition voter guides, the Church at Pierce Creek's
advertisement about Bill Clinton, the involvement of black
churches in political campaigns, and Catholic activity in favor of
195. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 42 (1976).
196. Putney, supra note 25, at 30.
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pro-life candidates-are all situations in which religious organiza-
tions participated in the political process out of a sense of civic,
religious, or moral responsibility to influence their culture. Even
if the activities resulted in overstepping the line between issue
advocacy and candidate advocacy, the law should not penalize
such activities when the Constitution places so great a value on
religious freedom. Though an individual church must act
responsibly with regard to campaign participation, it should not
have to look over its shoulder for crossing a line that is a ques-
tionable boundary in the first place.
Although the I.R.C's restriction against church participation
in political campaigns is absolute and the penalty for its violation
is potentially severe, the standard for determining what consti-
tutes participation in a political campaign is ambiguous. Ascer-
taining whether voter education literature is biased can be a
difficult task, dependent on the "facts and circumstances." Ques-
tions to be considered in making a determination of bias might
involve analyzing the number and types of issues placed on the
guide, whether the issues are presented or questions are asked in
a biased manner, whether the distributing organization's posi-
tions are included on the guide, and whether guides are regu-
larly printed at that time. 19 7  These numerous factual
circumstances can make a determination of bias rather compli-
cated and serve to demonstrate the vagueness of the standard for
participation in a political campaign.
One should also note that a "biased" voter guide or adver-
tisement that allegedly favors one candidate over another, might
be just as useful to the opposing candidate. For example, sup-
pose a voter guide lists two candidates: X, who opposes the
expansion of homosexual rights, and Y, who supports it. Passed
out in an evangelical or fundamentalist church, candidate X will
benefit more. However, changing the setting to a denomina-
tional church that advocates homosexual rights, candidate Y may
be the beneficiary. Because denominations take different posi-
tions on social issues, a different church could distribute the
same voter guide and make the "wrong" candidate look favorable
to its parishioners. Even if such a guide was prepared to purpose-
fully favor candidate X, candidate Y can benefit in a different
setting.
197. See Rev. Rul. 80-282, 1980-2 C.B. 178-79.
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VI. ALTERNATIVES
Given the lack of clarity posed by the existing prohibition
against electioneering by churches, the implication for religious
liberties, and the serious financial risks posed for churches who
feel compelled to speak out on particular issues or candidates,
Congress should strongly consider amending § 501 (c) (3).
Although the advantages of existing law should be considered,
several other options merit discussion as well. If Congress does
decide to alter existing law, it must decide also whether to alter
the law only for religious nonprofit organizations or for all non-
profits. Because of the First Amendment's specific affirmation of
religious freedom, perhaps Congress is warranted in implement-
ing a separate set of laws unique to religious organizations. The
discussion below does not assess the merits of altering existing
law for other non-religious § 501 (c) (3) organizations. Rather it
addresses a change in law only with regard to church involvement
in political campaigns. 198
A. Continue Current Standard
Maintaining the current absolute prohibition on the partici-
pation by nonprofit organizations in political campaigns is cer-
tainly one course of action (or more properly, inaction). One
can argue that current law has not produced an inordinate
number of problems and that any changes would produce more
complications. This argument might be summarized by the
cliche, "better the devil we know than the devil we don't." Fur-
thermore, supporters of the current restriction can argue based
on the subsidy view of tax exemptions and deductions-that by
allowing nonprofit organizations to participate in political cam-
paigns, the government is contributing to partisan politics and
violating its interest in neutrality.199
The key disadvantage of maintaining the current ban, as dis-
cussed throughout this Note, is its restrictiveness on churches
who wish to participate in the political debate because of legiti-
mate religious or community concerns and a sincere sense of
obligation. Because of the financial penalty churches could suf-
198. Some may argue that separate treatment of religious organizations
would violate the Establishment Clause, particularly in light of the fact that the
property tax exemption upheld in Walz was also available to other non-religious
entities. See Walz, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970). Even if such a separate scheme
were unconstitutional, however, Congress could simply apply a change in the
tax law to other charitable organizations. Nevertheless, the discussion that
follows in the text, like this entire Note, is written with religious organizations,
namely churches, in mind.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 124-30.
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fer if they cross the line, they may withdraw from the debate,
even though they can add a valuable perspective to the political
landscape.2 °0 A further problem is the standard's ambiguity.
Whether voter guides are biased or whether advertisements
"intervene" in a candidate's campaign is often difficult to
discern.
Hence, allowing the law to remain on the books as currently
written is not the best alternative. Although the debate over the
restriction on political activity will continue regardless of whether
or how the law is changed, a more equitable law can be crafted
for the sake of churches who feel morally compelled to speak on
contemporary issues which may sometimes "dissolve" into
candidates.
B. Completely Remove Restrictions on Campaigning
A completely opposite alternative would be to entirely elimi-
nate the restriction on churches' intervention in political cam-
paigns. One can argue that the current ban on electioneering
has caused a chilling effect on religion. In addition, it can be
argued, current law has caused excessive entanglement because
the government must make a determination as to whether a
church's activities have risen to the level of campaign participa-
tion. Removing the restriction would eliminate this excessive
entanglement because the IRS would no longer need to monitor
a reported church's activities or financial affairs.20'
Opponents of removing restrictions might point to the
Employment Division v. Smith2"2 case and argue that the current
ban on electioneering is constitutional because § 501(c) (3)
should be viewed as a generally applicable law from which the
government is under no duty to grant an exemption. Opponents
might also contend that eliminating the restrictions would result
in government improperly "subsidizing" electioneering activity,
instead of maintaining its neutrality. Further, completely removing
the restriction on electioneering could potentially open the
floodgates to abuse. Organizations might incorporate on their
face as religious even though the intent of the organizers might
be to primarily engage in electioneering. Although this could
violate another § 501 (c) (3) requirement of being "exclusively
religious," such scenarios might be difficult to police. Finally,
regardless of how legislators might feel about the current restric-
200. See Davis, supra note 118, at 110-11; see also supra text accompanying
notes 163-79.
201. See Putney, supra note 25, at 30.
202. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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tions, such a drastic change-from absolute prohibition to abso-
lute permission-might be difficult to pass politically. Perhaps a
more incremental approach is warranted.
C. Partially Remove Restrictions on Campaigning
A third alternative is to lessen the restrictions on election-
eering, allowing for some participation in campaigns within cer-
tain parameters. Specific options within this alternative include
(1) adopting the federal election disclosure rules regarding
"express advocacy"; (2) prohibiting only "substantial" participa-
tion in political campaigns; or (3) permitting a minimum quanti-
fiable percent of revenues to be used for political campaigns, as
proposed in a bill sponsored by Representatives Phil Crane and
Charlie Rangel in 1996.
1. Apply Federal Election Disclosure Rules
The IRS regulations governing an organization's tax-exempt
status are markedly different from the Federal Election Commis-
sion (FEC) laws that govern campaign finance disclosure. Under
federal election rules, an organization that speaks out on behalf
of a "clearly identified" electoral candidate must disclose its
expenditures if the statement, advertisement, or literature is con-
sidered "express advocacy."2" 3 In Federal Election Commission v.
Christian Action Network,2°4 a Christian advocacy organization ran
a television advertisement in 1992 that linked Bill Clinton to a
pro-homosexual agenda. The FEC sued the organization for fail-
ing to disclose its spending on the ad. However, the Fourth Cir-
cuit, in an effort to allow leeway and not to burden First
Amendment rights ruled in favor of the Christian Action Net-
work, holding that only those expenditures for communications
that use explicit words of candidate advocacy come under the
regulation. Because the ad did not use explicit words such as
"don't vote for Clinton" it was appropriate for the organization
not to disclose expenditures.20 5
As can be seen from the results in this case, the FEC "express
advocacy" disclosure rule presents a brighter line between per-
mitted and prohibited actions than the IRS rules. Adopting a
203. Carroll, supra note 31, at 259-60. Professor Laura Brown Chisholm
has proposed that nonprofit organizations be prohibited only from engaging in
activity that would fall under the disclosure rules of the Federal Election
Campaign Act (FECA): those expenditures for activities in which the
organization engaged in "express advocacy." See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
204. 110 F.3d 1049 (4th Cir. 1997).
205. Id at 1064.
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similar "express advocacy" standard and applying it to the per-
missibility of church conduct-as opposed to the disclosure of
spending as in federal election rules-would allow wider latitude
in discussing campaign issues before incurring any penalties. A
church organization could distribute some "biased" voter guides
that presented one candidate more favorably and still not trigger
any IRS corrective action because the church would not be
engaged in "express advocacy." In contrast, under current IRS
rules, such an action could potentially result in IRS review and
possible revocation of an organization's exempt status, though
intermediate sanctions would likely be applied first.
An argument against such a standard is that it might lead to
excessive implicit campaigning. Under this proposal, there
would be no limit on the quantity of activity, only limits on the
degree. As long as a church did not explicitly endorse or oppose a
candidate, it could make as many favorable or unfavorable state-
ments about a candidate as it wished. In the view of many peo-
ple, this proposal would allow too much leeway for church
politicking. Nonetheless, it would promote a more open discus-
sion of the issues and candidates.
2. Adopt a "Substantial Part" Standard
A second alternative for allowing some church participation
in campaigns would apply the same § 501 (c) (3) standard cur-
renfly in effect for lobbying: a church could participate in polit-
ical campaigning without the threat of exempt status being
revoked so long as electioneering was not a substantial part of its
activities. As one critic of current law has noted, "It is far more
practical to judge whether a church has engaged in substantial
political campaigning than it is to absolutely ban such
conduct."206
One key argument against this proposal would be the prob-
lem of the "substantiality" determination. When do the activities
of a church become substantial? The IRS might need to resort to
a "facts and circumstances" standard, which could lead to criti-
cisms of discriminatory application of the standard.207 The IRS
would likely have to develop some criteria for determining what
constitutes "substantial."
206. Putney, supra note 25, at 30.
207. See Branch Ministries, Inc. v. Richardson, 970 F. Supp. 11, 15-16
(D.D.C. 1997).
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3. Crane-Rangel Amendment: The Five Percent Rule
In an effort to alleviate the constitutional and enforcement
difficulties posed by the prohibition on electioneering and the
difficulties in determining whether a substantial amount of activ-
ity is devoted to lobbying, in 1996 Representatives Philip Crane,
Republican of Illinois, and Charles Rangel, Democrat of New
York, proposed the Religious Political Freedom Act. This Act, if
passed, would have amended § 501 (c) (3) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code to permit churches to spend up to five percent of their
gross revenues on political campaigning (for or against candi-
dates) and up to twenty percent of their revenues on influencing
legislation, so long as the combined amount spent on election-
eering and lobbying does not exceed twenty percent.20 As pro-
posed, the scope of the bill would be limited to churches; other
nonprofit organizations would not be eligible.20 9 One of the
advantages of such an amendment is that allegations of election-
eering, including the distribution of biased or partisan voter
guides, would not risk the loss of the church's tax-exempt status
in most situations, unless the church had engaged in enough
campaigning to surpass the threshold dollar amount.
Crane argues that a minimum amount of political activity is
appropriate. "Is allowing a candidate to come into a church to
speak from the pulpit, or allowing a meeting of a candidate's vol-
unteers in the church basement, really something we want to
prohibit?" 2 10 Citing religious freedom concerns, Crane writes:
With an ambiguous law and news stories such as those
describing the fate of the Church at Pierce Creek,
churches understandably are intimidated. The well-inten-
tioned actions of a single church member could endanger
the entire congregation.
. . . The Religious Political Freedom Act seeks to
expand participation in the political process. Allowing
churches to exercise their First Amendment rights without
fearing the loss of their tax-exempt status is not a partisan
issue. America's churches are as politically diverse as their
208. Bill Tracking Report, H.R. 2910, 104th Congress, 2d Session, LEXIS-
NEXIS (Jan. 31, 1996); see also Philip M. Crane, Q: Should Churches Be Able to
Lobby Congress and Support Candidates? Yes: Churches Have a Constitutional Right to
Promote Candidates They Endorse, INSIGHT MAG., Nov. 18, 1996, at 24; Laurie
Goodstein, Church Leaders Grow Anxious About IRS Scrutiny of Politics, COM.
APPEAL (Memphis, TN), June 1, 1996, at A13; Joan Lowy, National Tax-Exempt
Groups Come Under Fire for Lobbying, PLAIN-DEALER (Clev.), Feb. 9, 1997, at 22A.
209. See Crane, supra note 208, at 24.
210. Eliza Newlin Carlin, Rites Fight: 'God's Laws' v. the IRS's, NAT'L. J.,
June 15, 1996, available in 1996 WL 10107786.
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membership. With the modest legislative change I am pro-
posing, the primary function of churches will remain reli-
gious, not political.2 '
Crane thus sees his proposal as a means to protect freedom of
religion and the religious character of churches as well as a
means to eliminate controversy when some campaign involve-
ment takes place in a church.
Crane also asserts that enforcement of the current prohibi-
tion on political campaigning by churches can easily be influ-
enced by partisan politics, resulting in Democratic
administrations enforcing the rules more strictly against Republi-
can-friendly churches and vice versa.2 12 Despite the introduction
of the Religious Political Freedom Act, the measure never came
out of committee during the 104th Congress, and a similar provi-
sion was not reintroduced in the 105th Congress.
4. Assessment
Any of these three "partial" options would provide at least
some relief for churches that believe it is their duty to influence
society through civic participation. Although the first option,
adopting the FEC "express advocacy" standard, differs in effect
from the latter two, all three alternatives would likely be an
improvement over existing law. Each of the policies would allow
a church to distribute voter guides without fear of losing its tax-
exempt status because of arguably biased statements about a can-
didate. A church also would have the right to prepare voter
guides that included a very limited scope of issues.
All three alternatives would allow a church more freedom to
discuss candidate stances on controversial issues like abortion.
The second and third options would even allow a church to urge
members to vote for particular candidates. The lessening of
restrictions would provide churches relief from what may be
infringements on their free exercise and free speech rights. Fur-
ther, such a policy would seem to be consistent with the Court's
opinion in Regan on the substantial lobbying prohibition,
because churches could more easily participate in the political
process, but with limits. Airing campaign ads, engaging in polit-
ical discussion, and supporting certain candidates with similar
concerns or backgrounds would be permissible for a church,
though not necessarily wise. Yet, because a church still would be
limited in the extent to which it could engage in electioneering,
211. Crane, supra note 208, at 24.
212. See Carlin, supra note 210; see also Branch Ministries, Inc. v.
Richardson, 970 F. Supp. at 15-16.
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fears of encroaching too closely upon the separation of church
and state would be alleviated. A lessening of the restrictions with-
out an absolute removal also would be more feasible politically,
because this would reduce concerns about widespread abuse by
churches who engage in substantial politicking.
Arguments against partially easing the restrictions on elec-
tioneering include the same concerns as mentioned for the
complete removal of restrictions, but to a lesser extent: Estab-
lishment Clause concerns and the potential for abuse. Society
would undoubtedly require time to adjust to the new rules, espe-
cially in cases in which churches crossed the new brighter, but
pushed-back line. Though some individuals and organizations
will oppose any measure that leads to greater church participa-
tion in the political process, the nation's history and the
Supreme Court have affirmed the right of churches to speak vig-
orously on public issues.213
CONCLUSION
Section 501(c) (3) of the I.R.C. currently conditions tax
exemption for religious organizations on refraining from partici-
pating in political campaigns. Many churches, however, feel obli-
gated to influence society by engaging in the public debate.
Such religious participation can add value to the political process
and enhance the quality of public discussion. Very often,
churches will take strong positions on certain issues that are
simultaneously religious and political. These positions lead them
to favor those candidates advocating the same positions.
Under current law, however, campaigning by'a church for a
candidate is illegal, potentially threatening a church's tax-
exempt status. Technically, the prohibition against election-
eering encompasses such activities as distributing biased voter
guides. Because the Supreme Court has never ruled on the
I.R.C.'s provision forbidding participation in political campaigns
for candidates, the measure's constitutionality is uncertain; it
may depend in part on whether the policy of tax exemptions and
deductible contributions should be considered a subsidy or
merely a decision to leave churches alone, lest the free exercise
of religion be inhibited.
Even if the § 501(c) (3) measure is constitutional, it is not
sound public policy because it restricts the ability of some key
actors in society from fully participating and contributing to the
political process. Churches exist in part to teach morality and
213. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 670 (1970).
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influence behavior. Though it may not always be wise for a
church to become politically active, at times a church will feel
compelled to become involved in its pursuit ofjustice. Churches
have, after all, played a significant part in influencing public pol-
icy and political campaigns throughout the nation's history.The current provision in § 501 (c) (3) of the I.R.C. which
prohibits charitable organizations from participating in political
campaigns on behalf of or against a particular candidate for pub-
lic office should be amended. While completely removing the
restriction is unlikely and would raise concerns about abuse and
eroding the wall of separation, a partial easing of the restrictions
is warranted. Though Congress has various options, it should
consider implementing either: (1) an "express advocacy" rule, in
which political discussion and communication are allowed, so
long as the church does not engage in the literal advocacy or
defeat of a candidate; (2) a "substantial part" rule, in which
churches could participate in political campaigns, as long as the
activities do not constitute a substantial part of the church's activ-
ities; or (3) a "five percent" rule, where a church could spend up
to five percent of its revenues on political campaigning activities.
Whatever course will be taken will be left to the legislators, and
ultimately, to the voters. Any of these alternatives will alleviate
some substantial constitutional concerns as well as some coercive
conditions on religious activity. A change in the law will help
reduce the possibility that a church will lose its tax exempt status
because it participated in a political campaign out of a sense of
religious, moral, or civic duty. In a society whose Constitution
and traditions place a preeminent value on religious freedom,
easing the restrictions on church participation in the political
process is to be encouraged and applauded.
